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Emancipation as Freedom in Roe v.
Wade
Randall P. Bezanson*
I.

Preface

It is one thing to say that a woman can go to jail for the crime
of aborting her fetus.
It is a different thing to say that the state may actively participate in her choice - cajoling, applying emotional pressure, arguing,
delaying, imposing procedural hurdles - all in the interest of influencing her to choose against abortion, yet leaving her the "ultimate"
decision.
But it is quite another, and indeed extraordinary, thing to say
that the first of these alternatives, criminal punishment, is inconsistent with the woman's liberty and has been foreclosed by unmistakable social consensus; while the second alternative, involving invasive
state regulation of - indeed control over - a woman's decision,
poses no risk to her liberty.
Yet this is precisely what the Supreme Court said in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.1
Introduction

II.

"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."' 2 So began
the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.3 Yet it was as
if the Court were declaring victory in the vain hope of saving liberty
at the very moment of its loss, for on the most basic question posed
by Roe v. Wade4 doubt was not dispelled. While reaffirming Roe, yet
discarding its trimester structure and rejecting its strict scrutiny protection, the Court (more accurately, a plurality of three) left uncertain the very nature of the choice being protected. Indeed, the Court
left in doubt whether what is constitutionally protected is the woman's choice at all. Left in doubt, in short, was freedom.
In the place of Roe, the Casey Court left two legacies. The first
*

1.
2.
3.
4.

Dean and Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2803.
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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is a legacy of strict analogical reasoning 5 that left the substantive
liberty interest unarticulated and allowed the plurality to legitimize
significant regulation of the woman's choice in the interest of evenhandedness. The second legacy is one of intrusion, of governmentcompelled speech, of government-enforced listening, and of active
and persuasive governmental participation in the woman's decision.
Indeed, it is a legacy premised on the moral incompleteness of
woman.
In the pages that follow I will explore both legacies, beginning
with the Court's analogical reasoning, or its idea of equality. Thereafter I will turn to intrusion and to the view of women as incomplete
moral ageijts that is imbedded in the plurality's rationale. While
each legacy is distinct from the other, the two are also interrelated,
bearing ultimately on the meaning of freedom in Roe v. Wade.
III.

Equality and Freedom

Roe v. Wade has been considered a symbol of equality for
women. This has been true not only in the political setting but also
in law, where despite its foundation in privacy and liberty Roe has
often been justified by resort to claims premised on equality. 6 Paradoxically, this has played a large part in the decision's undoing, for
the woman's claim recognized in Roe .is quite clearly not based on
equality, but on freedom.
From the standpoint of freedom, equality is a dependent, not an
independent, right. At least this is so in our American constitutional
jurisprudence. By this I mean that, apart from the substantive idea
of equality itself, the guarantee of equality confers no substantive
rights; it simply measures the quantity and quality of rights due one
person against those enjoyed by another.7 To be sure, some rights or
interests require a more exacting degree of equality in their enjoyment than others, but this does not disguise the essentially relational,
or analogical, and non-substantive nature of constitutional equality.8
5. 1 will refer to this strict analogical reasoning as equality reasoning because it is imbedded in a particular and narrow view of equality.
6. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 987-1002 (1984); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382-86 (1985).
7. Much more should be said, as the matter is not in truth this simple, but this essay
form does not permit it. For an elegant and thorough treatment of the subject of constitutional
equality, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-1672 (2d ed.
1988).
8. The relational character of equality has generated frustration from time to time. The
frustration has been felt, for example, in the setting of education, where a requirement of
equality unaccompanied by any minimal demand for quality is viewed by many as an empty

EMANCIPATION AS FREEDOM IN

ROE V.

WADE

Freedom,. on the other hand, is an independent right, by which I
mean only that it exists independently of concerns about the equality
of its distribution. Freedom possesses its own meaning and substance, determined in a reasoned way but not simply derivative of
that possessed by others. Its meaning is not dictated, and thereby
limited, by the degree to which others have it or by the equality of
its distribution.
It is a serious error to confuse freedom and equality. If freedom
becomes dependent on equality, freedom will suffer, for the extent of
one's freedom will be dependent on, and ultimately limited by, that
enjoyed by others. Such confusion lies at the very heart of the plurality's opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and as a result freedom has suffered.
Justice Blackmun has articulated a radically different view from
that reflected in the Casey decision. He sees Roe as a necessary step
in the full emancipation of women. 9 This understanding is both evocative and profound: evocative because it conjures up images of both
equality and freedom; profound because it represents an approach
that achieves freedom rather than just equality. Justice Blackmun
insists that we think about equality in a different sense than our conventional modes of constitutional analysis have thus far offered:
equality in substance rather than in form. He expresses a view under
which the substantive interest in privacy or freedom is not measured
by that enjoyed by others, reasoning is not confined to analogical
discourse, and the woman's right is hers alone and not shared.
My purpose is to reveal how equality can fall short of freedom
and why freedom should be viewed independently of equality even, paradoxically, in a case born of the struggle for equality. I
shall undertake this task in a somewhat unconventional way. I will
not explore constitutional history, the relevant textual provisions, or
promise. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); JOHN E. COONS,
WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970). Similar frustration has been expressed in the area of basic needs, where the
standard of equality in the government's distribution of benefits and services is at its ebb, and
thus equality is an empty promise. In response to these frustrations, some scholars have proposed that the idea of equality be broadened to include recognition of substantive rights which
exist, in theory at least, independently of concerns about their equal distribution. They have
proposed, in short, that equality be made the vessel though which rights to education, to basic
subsistence, and to free expression, to name but a few, be read into the Constitution. Such
efforts have generally failed, both because the underlying substantive rights being claimed
lacked independent textual support in the Constitution, and because to recognize them through
the equality guarantee would have stretched the constitutional idea of equality beyond its intellectually legitimate limits.
9. 25 IOWA ADVOCATE 18 (Fall/Winter 1986-87). Justice Blackmun's precise words
were that Roe represents "a milestone on the path to full emancipation of women." Id. at 18.
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the body of cases and precedents upon which the Court relied in
Roe. Instead, I will analyze the varied meanings that have come to
be attributed to the decision. Each will be judged in terms of its
explanatory power as well as its relation to freedom as a measure of
equality rather than the opposite, equality as a measure of freedom.
The meanings I will survey are, I suspect, quite familiar: gender
equality; control over one's body; the right to make choices of a personal and moral or ethical character; and freedom from government
intrusion in matters involving family, including procreation and child
rearing. To one degree or another, each of these rationales is accepted by the Casey plurality, but none of them satisfactorily explains the decision in Roe. Each is imprisoned by ideas based in
equality, rests largely if not exclusively on analogical reasoning, and
thus fails to reflect a full-bodied, non-dependent, idea of emancipation or freedom.
Unless Roe v. Wade can be understood to transcend equality, as
such, its force is compromised. Indeed, the continual erosion of Roe
may be directly traceable to equality-based reasoning. Equalitybased reasoning conceives of the woman's right to choose abortion
only in terms of a man's right to an analogous choice. This in turn
denies the woman the decision, uniquely, as a woman, and therefore
permits the manner in which her choice is exercised to be subordinated to the state's policy preferences as embodied in law. Thus imprisoned, the ultimate demise of Roe is foreordained.
A.

Gender Equality
"[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law .... Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman's role .. .
"[I]t does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from
taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may
enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know
that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight
that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy
to full term . .. ."
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807, 2818
(1992) (plurality opinion).

EMANCIPATION AS FREEDOM IN ROE V. WADE

"This assumption - that women can simply be forced to accept
the "natural" status and incidents of motherhood - appears to
rest upon a [particular] conception of women's role .... "
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2847
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
The argument that Roe v. Wade is based on the equality of
women is expressed in various ways, but it is based ultimately on the
idea of equality itself. Therefore, at its core, the argument is relational and not substantive. It rests on the substantively neutral idea
of equal position between men and women.
The equality argument has numerous features that distinguish it
from a different kind of claim based upon emancipation, or freedom.
Most importantly, it requires that women be viewed as "persons,"
thus excluding from the argument elements or qualities that are distinct to women. A woman's right as a "person" to decisionmaking
authority is therefore dependent upon other claims of authority possessed by persons generally. The content of the decisionmaking authority is defined by that which is possessed by others. An equality
argument, by its very nature, forecloses a claim of distinct or special,
or quantitatively greater, authority for women than for men. Indeed,
the content of the right claimed pursuant to equality is irrelevant to
the argument. It is in this sense that the equality argument is often,
and accurately, viewed as substantively "empty."
The empty nature of the equality claim is not altered by an additional argument that with respect to certain kinds of rights or interests a more exacting standard of equality will apply. 10 Often
called "strict scrutiny," the exacting standard does nothing more
than provide that with certain interests possessed by others the demands of true equality of enjoyment will be greater. The argument
does not, however, confer those other rights or interests; they exist as
rights only to the extent other persons enjoy them. To be sure, some
interests that receive greater protection under such equality reasoning are more fundamental to the social order and its animating ideas
than others. Often such other interests are found in patterns of social
or cultural history and experience. They are thus more legally forceful than shorter-term, political "interests", but they nevertheless find
their source in history or perhaps in legislation, not in the Constitution. Therefore, such important interests are subject to rejection by
the normal democratic legislative decisionmaking process; equality
10. See generally,
(2d ed. 1988).

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1436-1672
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reasoning only assures that their rejection be evenhanded.1 1
Even if the abortion decision involves an important substantive
interest requiring application of strict scrutiny, an argument based in
equality confers no freestanding substantive right. The woman's
right to decide is, as a matter of equality reasoning, wholly dependent, whether its equal enjoyment is given the special protection of
strict scrutiny or not. Therefore, the state is not foreclosed from giving its own definition to the meaning of "life" or, as with education
or property, to the meaning of "liberty," so long as it does so
evenhandedly.
The relational character of the equality argument has the effect
of diminishing the woman's claim in the abortion setting. It makes
that claim dependent upon claims that others have successfully vindicated or upon privileges that others now enjoy. It requires that one
find analogues in actual and existing legal rights. Without those analogues, the abortion claim fails, and with them - and this is the
most important point - the abortion claim is circumscribed by their
terms.
For reasons that I will develop later, there are no analogues for
the abortion decision. Any that can be found are sufficiently different
that measuring the abortion claim against them diminishes the abortion right in ways that compromise its effectiveness and deprive it of
principled force. For example, an equality-based argument premised
on the analogue of freedom to use contraception requires that the
abortion claim be rewritten as one of mutual choice in the context of
voluntary action. Thus, the other biological parent is drawn into the
equation. It also permits a critical distinction to be drawn between
the prevention of conception and interference after the point of conception. Whatever the definition one might give to life, it is clear.
that such an equality argument itself invites and must by its terms
address, the potential life distinction, and by any standard the poten11. For example, it might well be argued that education represents such an interest, at
least in our Western culture. But the argument is one, in essence, of historical fact and cultural pattern, and nothing in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution suggests
that the legislative process could not redefine or, indeed, turn its back on that history and
experience. The same might be said for the claim of fair treatment in the ownership of property, even though in that context the claim might be bolstered by the explicit constitutional
mention of property. Yet the Supreme Court was quite right in its recent decision, written by
Justice Blackmun, that the demonstrable unfairness to new owners of property, and the obstacle to access to ownership, posed by Proposition 13 in California did not require invalidation of
that democratically-arrived-at law. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992). Justice
Blackmun quite properly concluded that California could give its own definition to the meaning of fairness in the context of property ownership, as long as it did so by democratic means;
indeed, California could give its own meaning to property itself, property being largely a construction of law.
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tial life argument, in the relational context of an equality argument,
is an extremely strong one.
Similarly, an equality-based argument premised on the analogue of a general freedom of individuals to act upon religious beliefs, or to make decisions based upon ethical or moral beliefs, has
the effect of limiting the circumstances in which and the types of
reasons upon which a woman can make an abortion decision. For
example, one might argue in favor of a woman's right to abort a
fetus on grounds that such a decision is no less consequential than a
Christian Scientist parent's ability to make medical decisions about
the treatment of a child, including the decision to have no treatment
even at the risk of certain death.
The Christian Scientist analogy, however, alters or reshapes the
woman's claim in two fundamental respects. First, the claim in the
Christian Scientist situation is essentially one of shared decisionmaking authority, not one unique to the woman. Second, the right of the
Christian Scientist parent, to the extent that it exists, is limited by
the parent's obligation to make such decisions for the right kinds of
reasons and in the right kinds of ways. Such decisions, in other
words, must be genuinely based upon fundamental religious conviction, and must be made with great care and seriousness. They must
be made, in other words, on the basis of their own self-selected (in
this case religiously-grounded) orthodoxy.
Even similar claims based on notions of the individual's ability
to make moral and ethical decisions are constrained by the requirement that the decisions be made seriously and for moral or ethical
kinds of reasons. The kinds of reasons required - moral and ethical
represent a form of secular orthodoxy. They would legitimize only
certain kinds of decisions by a woman to have an abortion, and
would delegitimize others, such as a decision based upon "mere"
lifestyle choices, or preferences about her preferred future life, or
12
even judgments about risks of deformity.
All of these arguments - arguments about whether the decision should be shared by the father or the husband, about the basis
for the woman's decision, about the countervailing interest in life or
potential life, and others implied by the analogical or relational
12. I am not arguing that such grounds for an abortion decision may not be "moral," for
they may unquestionably be based on deep-seated ethical convictions, or grounded in utilitarian thought, for example. I argue instead that (1) they are not necessarily of such character;
(2) that we should not require such a grounding; and (3) that to do so, or (more likely) to
require that some other moral view be followed, would be to violate one's freedom as an individual moral agent.
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methodology of equality-based reasoning - are implicit in the
equality argument itself. They illustrate why the equality argument,
as such, is substantively empty. The argument ignores the underlying
substantive content of the woman's claim. Indeed it treats the substance as irrelevant, and instead moves directly to an implied balancing of interests, to questions of how one balances off the woman's
decision against the fetus's potential, the husband's interest, or the
interest of parents in the case of a pregnant minor. Having effectively left the woman's claim undefined, the ultimate conclusion to
the abortion analysis is preordained, for how, as against a substantively undefined claim by the woman, can one ignore in the balance
such socially and culturally well-established, and often equalitybased, interests as the interest of a husband, the interest of a parent,
or the interest of a fetus?
This is not to say that "equality" is an inappropriate concept in
the abortion setting. A different and, for me, more acceptable equality argument can be made that women cannot be genuinely equal, by
which I mean afforded the full measure of recognition as free individuals, without the ability to make a choice about childbirth.
Women cannot enjoy the fullness of rights and responsibilities as
free individuals without the freedom to make that choice. While
such a claim of "equality" is substantial and consistent with the view
I express here, it should also be observed that this equality argument
is one which does not rest on equality alone. Rather it requires that a
decision to have an abortion be substantively justified independently
of the equality argument, on the ground that it is necessary to or
inherent in the degree of freedom which is needed for the woman to
be a full and equal person. The argument, in other words, can be
freed of the difficulties associated with other dependent equality arguments only if the foundation upon which it rests - the freedom to
make a decision to bear a child or not - can be independently justified as an essential element of individual liberty. It is the latter question that the Court avoided addressing in the Casey decision, and it
is with respect to that element that the idea of freedom or emancipation is fundamental.
For those who find the dependent equality argument unsatisfying, as I do, an appreciation of its limitations only serves to bring us
full-circle to the starting point: What is the nature of the claim
made by a woman in the abortion setting? In Justice Blackmun's
view it is a claim, not of equality, but of freedom; a claim that he
describes by the term "emancipation." Other common formulations
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of the woman's claim in the abortion setting purport to express the
woman's claim as something more than one of equality. But upon
careful analysis we shall see that most of them are premised on and
ultimately imprisoned by equality. None of them succeeds in capturing the idea of emancipation. In other words, none of them measures
up to Justice Blackmun's implicit requirement that the claimed authority be unique to the woman and fundamental to her freedom.
B.

The Right to Control One's Body
"The trimester framework ...

was erected to ensure that

the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the
State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in
theory but not in fact."
"We reject the trimester framework .... .
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818
(1992) (plurality opinion).
"By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State
conscripts women's bodies into its service .

...

"

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
The argument perhaps most often heard in defense of Roe v.
Wade, particularly in feminist expression, is the right of the woman
to control her body. This is a claim of unilateral authority over one's
body, although at base its particular application concerns invasive
procedures - physical intrusions into the body or control over its
physiological condition. The claim is analogous, perhaps, to a claim
of ownership over property; indeed, "ownership" is a term often used
when making the argument.
The constitutional argument for a woman's control over her
body poses two fundamental problems. The first is that it lacks explanatory basis; it is essentially a bald assertion of "right" or
"power". It fails to answer the question: Why should a woman have
control over her body? If the right to control one's body cannot be
explained as a freestanding and articulable right unique to the freedom of the woman, its definition becomes dependent in character
and reliant not on its own substance but on rights or powers over the
body enjoyed by others in similar contexts.
The claim that a woman enjoys a substantive right to control
her body, as distinguished from the derivative conclusion that the
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woman's right to decide necessarily implies a correlative right to
control one's body, has not been successfully explained. When making such a claim, one must first describe what one means by controlling one's body, and in what settings such claims should be recognized. The answer may be that the claim applies in all instances and
to all aspects of the body, or instead to the abortion decision alone. If
the latter, one must explain why the abortion decision is unique in
relation to this claim."3 It is obvious that the bald assertion of authority over the body, without more, is in itself not sufficient to answer the very question that the assertion raises: What does it mean
and why should we accept it?
Without an explanation, the claim of control over one's body
must be defined and justified by analogy with other claims. Once the
question of analogues arises, the argument becomes essentially one
of equality. It does so both in the sense that the definition and substance of the right are dependent on the degree and kind of right
enjoyed by others in other settings, and also in the sense that the
right is restricted by that enjoyed in such other settings, and, therefore, does not exist, because it cannot be expressed, as a right possessed of a force of its own.
Here, the argument's weakness becomes evident, for there is little basis in other contexts for a purely analogical claim of control
over one's body that could justify abortion. The criminal law, for
example, is replete with instances in which the state asserts, on the
basis of nonconstitutional interests, authority for bodily intrusion.
Searches and seizures involve, by definition, control of the body, including invasive penetration of the body in some instances. Other
obvious examples include incarceration, commitment for mental
health treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment.
A more direct and illustrative example can be found with surgical procedures. One does not possess an unlimited right to exercise
control over one's body in the context of surgical procedures. To be
sure, one can generally decline surgery even when advisable, but one
cannot insist upon it when it is inadvisable. The right to decide about
surgical procedures is constrained by "reasonable medical practice,"
and by external policy preferences reflected in law (indeed, often established by law). Extending such reasoning to the abortion decision
13. I am not suggesting that such an argument cannot be made; indeed, I believe that it
can, and I suggest its basic elements later in this Article. But such an argument, which rests
on autonomy, individuality, and the freedom to act as one's own moral agent with respect to
life-defining decisions, does not rest on control of one's body. Instead, control of one's body, in
some instances (like abortion), is simply a manifestation of freedom, not the freedom itself.
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yields an obvious and open invitation for regulation. In the absence
of a more discrete rationale than a general right to control of one's
body, external norms, no longer simply moral and ethical but also
medical and set by a profession, can by analogy be made to govern
the woman's control over the abortion procedure and her ability to
submit to bodily invasion.
More importantly, the right to exercise control over one's body
in the medical context is based on the legally explicit premise that
the individual is able to make such controlling choices. In other
words, the individual must be able to consent in an informed fashion. 4 Informed consent, in turn, means that the person making a
decision must, as a precondition to the exercise of authority, possess
and be judged capable of acting upon full information about rewards
as well as risks. The conclusion that follows from this reasoning is
that the claim of control over one's body permits - indeed it generates - the deeply invasive restrictions that the Casey plurality allowed states to place on abortion, such as requirements that the woman be confronted with facts pertaining to both medical and ethical
implications of abortion, that she submit to mandatory (and persuasive) counselling, and that required waiting periods be imposed in
which persuasion can take hold. The plurality opinion in Casey explicitly said as much and more by declaring constitutionally valid
state regulations designed to persuade the woman to adopt the
state's chosen option by the provision of "full" information, waiting
15
periods for reflection, and overt counselling and persuasion.
In the end, then, the argument that abortion reflects the woman's right to control her body is either inadequate because it does
not explain that unique claim in the abortion setting, or is relational
and based, essentially, on equality. In the latter form the claim
draws analogically on other instances of control of one's body that
are far from absolute, and that serve not to empower the woman but
instead to legitimize regulation of the abortion decision - indeed in
the end to compel restriction of the very right the claim was
designed to vindicate.
14. It is unsurprising, in view of the decision reached, that the plurality in Casey was
quite explicit in its reference to, and reliance upon, informed consent requirements in the medical setting - although the information permitted in Casey went well beyond the realm of
medicine. See Panned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992) (plurality opinion).
15.

Id. at 2823-26 (plurality opinion).
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C. The Right to Make Choices of a Personal and Moral or Ethical Quality
"Regulations which do no more than create a structuralmechanism by which the State ...may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn are permitted ...
"To promote the state's profound interest in potential life
• . .the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's
choice is informed . ..."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821
(1992) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).

"[R]estrictive abortion laws deprive [the woman] of basic
control over her life ...[because] 'the decision whether or not
to beget or bear a child' lies at 'the very heart of this cluster of
constitutionally protected choices.'"
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
Perhaps because of the inadequacies of the arguments based
strictly on equality and on the woman's right to control her body, it
is often argued that Roe v. Wade rests on the individual's right to
make choices of a personal and moral or ethical quality. This argument succeeds in providing a free-standing substantive justification,
and one that finds support in many other contexts, not the least of
which is the freedom of religion. Indeed, as I will develop in Part IV,
the liberty or freedom underlying Roe is grounded in just such an
idea. In my view, there is a critical distinction that must be understood, Roe has to do with decisions that have moral or ethical consequences, not with making decisions morally or ethically.
The personal and moral or ethical decisionmaking rationale in
its most common articulation, and in the plurality's view in Casey, is
but one instance of a generalized principle and, therefore, is not specific to a woman or to the abortion decision. Instead, it explains and
protects the woman's right in only limited contexts and limited ways.
As the plurality put it, "[B]ecause the informed consent requirement
facilitates the wise exercise of [the woman's right to decide] it cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects." 16
A liberty expressed as the individual's freedom to make choices
16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (emphasis added) (plurality opinion).
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of a deeply personal and moral or ethical quality can be significantly
limited by its own terms. It does not require that the woman's choice
be recognized as free, at least to the extent that freedom implies the
ability to take action as a free moral agent. Instead, it can be (and
was in Casey) viewed as a liberty that protects a woman's choice
only to the extent that it comports with externally-imposed criteria
for freedom. It explains the woman's decision as only one instance of
a larger typology of decisions, the legitimacy of which are judged not
strictly as a product of the individual's freedom but instead as a reward for the individual's compliance with socially-imposed standards
of expectation. Those standards commonly require that to be legitimate a decision must be seriously undertaken on the basis of certain
17
kinds of personal, and essentially moral or ethical, reflection.
This analytical methodology has the effect of introducing the
balancing of interests involved in the abortion decision (only a woman's interests that qualify as deeply personal and moral or ethical
will be credited) into the very justification for the decision itself. The
woman's right to make a decision, for example, is implicitly outweighed by the competing interests in potential life when the decision is not personal, but is instead impersonal, social, or in other respects involves others, or when the grounds for the decision fall short
of the orthodoxy of serious moral or ethical reflection. Where do interests in lifestyle, career, or burden and pain of childbirth, fit into
this equation? They don't; they have been balanced away as part of
the very definition of the claimed liberty, for such interests do not
qualify as suitably moral or ethical.
The plurality's approach in Casey illustrates the point well. The
Court was quite careful to state, in almost begrudging recognition of
the holding of Roe, that the woman possesses "ultimate" 18 authority
to decide upon abortion prior to viability. But the Court explicitly
concluded that state regulation expressly designed to discourage
abortion by persuasion, by the provision of mandated information of
an argumentative as well as factual nature, and by associated waiting periods would be constitutional throughout the woman's pregnancy, including prior to viability. Furthermore, the Court would
foreclose the woman's "ultimate" power to decide if the required
decisionmaking process was not followed. 1 9 In previous decisions the
Court had held that attempts by the state to influence the woman's
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2822-26.
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choice through persuasive counselling, etc., prior to viability would
unconstitutionally interfere with the woman's right to choose; only
after viability could the state attempt to vindicate its interest in potential life.20
The Court's change in view on the timing and extent of government intervention necessarily implies a change of substance in the
woman's right. The right conferred on the woman by the Casey plurality is not the right to decide, which includes not only the right to
execute a decision but to formulate it as well, but rather the right to
make a certain kind of choice. 2 1 The woman is given "ultimate" authority in form alone; she may exercise it only pursuant to a process
satisfying the state's preferences about considerations that the state
deems relevant to the woman's decision and the seriousness with
which she should make it. If she does not abide by the process, her
decision to abort is invalid and if she acts upon that decision she has
acted illegally. There is no other way to read the Court's decision.
The woman's right, therefore, is the right only to make a kind
of choice.2" To be sure, if the woman can ultimately say "no" to the
state's efforts at persuasion, the state's practical authority to influence her choice will be limited to influencing process, not substance. 3 Yet the state's authority to cajole and persuade in service
of its preference for fetal life is great enough to assure that the decision made is of a "substantively-imposed type," if not a substantively-imposed outcome. And many decisions will be of a substantively-imposed outcome, too, for why else than to succeed would the
state seek the coercive authority to persuade?
The woman's freedom to decide is really only a freedom to decide in certain ways at certain times. Therefore, the right is not ex20. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 442-49
(1983).
21. It might be argued that many other situations exist in which the government mandates the provision of information to an individual prior to the individual making a decision,
such as truth-in-lending requirements or cigarette warnings. Apart from the differences in the
kind of decision made, it is important to recognize that in neither of these cases is the individual (the beneficiary of the information) foreclosed from making a decision if the information is
not read or taken seriously - indeed, even if the information is not required. Under Casey,
however, the woman's ability to decide is extinguished if she does not abide by the procedures
through which the information and persuasion is provided; indeed, her decision in such circumstances can, one must assume, be made illegal.
22. Indeed, the woman's ultimate power to choose, which the Court grants, is not logically necessary in view of the reasoning the Court used in the case. Instead it appears to
function only instrumentally to constrain the state's likely appetite for increasing interference.
23. Of course the woman who, by virtue of ignorance or apprehension, is incapable of
exercising the "ultimate" authority to refuse the state's entreaty will in reality have no ultimate authority.
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clusively the woman's but is shared by society. As the plurality expressed its rationale in Casey, the abortion decision is in effect
delegated for instrumental or functional reasons to the woman, and
only so long as she abides by the rules.2 4 So understood, the rationale
anticipates, even demands, social control and regulation, for in significant respects the woman is serving as society's decision-making
agent. Society can therefore demand that she be fully informed of
the risks as well as the rewards of the procedure, both medical and
moral, and its consequences for the extinguishment of potential life
(which is clearly a moral issue and a legitimate part of any required
ethical equation). She can be required to postpone her choice in order to assure adequate time for serious deliberation. She can be subjected to overt persuasion, whether she wants it or needs it. Just as
others can be compelled by government to speak to her, 6 she can be
compelled to listen. The woman can constitutionally be required to
limit the grounds upon which she makes "her" decision. Society can
legitimately attempt to assure that before making her decision the
woman is sufficiently informed and persuaded, that she engages in
sufficient reflection, and that the moral and ethical quality of her
choice reflects society's preferences.
The Casey plurality's moral and ethical decision-making rationale, in short, fails to meet a test of freedom at the most elemental
level. It fails to articulate the woman's choice as being hers. It fails
to recognize her choice as growing out of her freedom and her liberty. It treats the woman as a social agent, thus requiring searching
inquiry into the woman's decision and, most importantly, denying
the constitutional significance of her decision. So understood. the
moral and ethical choice argument has little to do with the woman's
emancipation or with her freedom. Indeed, it treats the woman as
imprisoned by society's chosen moral orthodoxy, and surrounded by
others who are entitled to substitute their own moral agency for
hers.2"
However, the freedom to choose acknowledged by Roe v. Wade
is not the freedom to choose sometimes, in only some ways, and only
for reasons others would impose. Such a view of freedom, if that be
24. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (plurality opinion).
25. Rust v. Sullivan, 11l S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
26. The Court's rationale leaves room, logically, for the sharing of the decision. That
sharing can be reflected, for example, in the disqualification of women who, by virtue of age or
mental condition, are deemed incapable of full moral or ethical reasoning, and in participation
in the decision by parents whose children are presumptively unlikely to base the choice on the
right kinds of reasons or arrive at the decision by the right kind of process. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-33 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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its name, is too circumscribed, its responsibility too dispersed. One
could hardly use "emancipation", a term which connotes a wholeness
of freedom and an entirety of responsibility, to describe such a limited choice.
D. Freedom from Government Intrusion Into Matters of Family,
Procreation,and Child-Rearing
"What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others- in doing so..
. . [S]tate measure[s] designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that
goal."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821
(1992) (plurality opinion).
"[W]hen the State restricts a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make her own
decision about reproduction and family planning - critical life
choices that this Court long has deemed central to the right to
privacy."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
Finally, we should turn to a variety of arguments that fall generally under the heading of freedom from government intrusion into
matters of family, procreation, and child-rearing. These arguments
often overlap with, but are distinct from, those discussed in the previous section dealing with freedom to make decisions of a personal
and moral or ethical character. Here the argument is based not on
the individual's freedom to decide, but on the object of decision the family - and government's involvement in its affairs. The argument against government intervention focuses on a social unit that is
central to the American social order, in which a host of decisions can
be made more sensitively to the individualized, often unique, and
constantly changing experiences of a family. Preference for delegated decision-making authority in the family unit is premised on
the view that better decisions can be made locally and in an individualized fashion when the circumstances bearing on the decision are
highly discrete and when the decision-making group is bound by ties
of blood and affection. In such contexts, decisions by government
which, by necessity, are dispassionate and typically blunt-edged, are
clearly inferior.
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The very articulation of the rationale for freedom from government intrusion into matters of family, procreation, and child-rearing
may serve to disclose its fundamental weakness in explaining the woman's right in Roe v. Wade. The decision-making authority the argument confers is functional and utilitarian, concerning a preference
among alternative decision-makers; it says nothing about the inherent character of the decision or the decision-maker herself. The rationale, in other words, looks not to the decisionmaker, but to the
decision. It thus has little if anything to do with freedom; it has everything to do with rational social ordering.
We might ask, for example, why a parent should be able to
make decisions about the discipline of a child. Is it because such
disciplinary decisions are a part of the parent's freedom, because
they inhere in parenthood? I think not, at least in terms of the Constitution's distribution of authority. Instead, parents make such decisions, as a general rule, because it is practically sensible to let them
do so, and because we suspect that their decisions, in general, will
possess the qualities that society feels perfectly free to expect in that
context. The rationale does not negate government's or society's legitimate claim to intrude. But it does reflect the fact that, if society
were to intrude in any other than the most extreme cases, it would
likely make a mess of it at this specific level of particularized
discipline.
I have purposely used a controversial illustration to make my
point most clearly. Some will disagree, of course, on the ground that
a parent's disciplinary authority is inherent and stems from a fundamental, and perhaps natural, legal principle. Perhaps this is so, although not in any.absolute terms, as state intervention in parenting
is common, and in many respects the concept of parenthood (and
especially paternity) is a product of state law definition. But for
those who would object to the idea of parental discipline as an essentially functional concept, the point can be as easily made in the context of student and teacher, where the law's deference is more explicitly grounded in notions of functional efficiency.
Whatever the illustration used, the point is that the freedom
from governmental intrusion rationale, in the abortion setting, ultimately fails to address the woman as decisionmaker and to attach
constitutionalsignificance to the woman's ability to decide as a part
of her freedom or identity as an individual woman. The rationale
instead would suggest only that women could be allowed to make
such decisions if, in view of society's preferences, they are judged
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more able than others to do so for practical and utilitarian reasons.
The argument thus fails on grounds of freedom and also because,
even in its more limited nature, it provides no explanation for why a
woman, as opposed to others, should make or participate in the
decision.
IV.

Freedom as Emancipation
"[T]he informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of [the woman's] right [to decide] .. .
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826
(1992) (plurality opinion).
"[P]ersonal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity,
identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of
government."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).

It should come as no surprise, in view of the failure of all of
these rationales to meet Justice Blackmun's "emancipation" standard, that Roe v. Wade has been significantly undermined. Indeed,
one might argue that Roe has been so fundamentally recast through
these rationales that any claim meeting Justice Blackmun's standard
of a woman's unique right to choose as an element of her freedom
has been fully extinguished. Thus, little remains of the Supreme
Court's original decision. The formal deed of overruling seems an
empty and almost petty gesture, and the Court's protestations of
obeisance to Roe in Casey appear almost Machiavellian.
But the question remains whether Roe means more than these
rationales imply. Justice Blackmun thinks it does, as do I. The rationale, I believe, has in fact been properly voiced by Justice Blackmun as "emancipation."
A. Preconditionsfor Freedom: Moral Agency and the Burden of
Choice

"We are doomed to choose ....

"27

The term emancipation implies a very different understanding
of the woman's decision. First, it implies that the decision is important in and of itself and for the woman. It is, in short, not a decision
27.

ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY

13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
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made in service of other objectives, but one whose intrinsic value lies
in its necessary expression of freedom. It is in this respect that Justice Blackmun describes the woman's decision as fundamental to her
because its outcome shapes her moral identity, her physical and
emotional identity, and her future as a woman. 8 He defines her authority to decide as a product of her privacy, not as a product of her
right to have an abortion.2 9
Second, the idea of emancipation requires that the decision be
seen as unique and important in and of itself, and constitutionally
valuable in terms of the individual's liberty, not as a logical byproduct of other liberties. This does not mean that the abortion decision is or must be fully unique in human experience, but rather that
it cannot be compared descriptively with other like decisions, which
are similarly unique. Only a woman becomes pregnant. That simple
fact makes the decision unique. To condition, limit, or qualify that
unique decision by requiring that it conform to a mold cast by other
decisions in other contexts is to deny the decision its uniqueness and.
its moral significance.
Finally, emancipation implies the individual's freedom to
choose, which in turn requires that one making a decision bear the
burden of choice. Freedom implies the ability to make a decision as
an independent, individual moral agent. It requires that one possess
the authority to make, and bear the responsibility for making,
choices of one's own free will. It necessarily implies that among the
range of possible choices are mistaken ones, and it assumes that the
considerations one brings to the choice may not be limited by externally imposed criteria that reflect the preferences of others whether
those preferences be of sectarian origin or stem from a more secular
requirement of "wisdom." 3 Choices are not, truly, choices, and free28. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
29. The right at issue in Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), of course, is the right of
privacy - of individual freedom from government intrusion in private matters - not, as the
public dialogue would have it, the right to have an abortion, or the right to choose. Pro-abortion or pro-choice terminology are understandable formulations for general public debate, but
they produce unfortunate results if they begin to influence the terms of constitutional discourse, as they have.
It is possible, for instance, to be "pro-life" and "pro-choice" if one defines the constitutional issue as one of privacy and the proper locus of decisionmaking authority. But to do so
the issue must be allowed to transcend the boundaries of our public debate, and to transcend
the parameters of abortion only. One can be against abortion on deeply moral grounds and
also against governmental involvement in the decision, just as one can be a genuine humanitarian and a pacifist yet at the same time remain obedient to the laws of one's nation when it is
at war.
30. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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dom is not, truly, freedom, unless we are obliged to select among all
possibilities and fully bear the responsibility for that selection.
It is inconsistent with treating the woman as a full and free
moral agent to permit her to choose for only some reasons, moral or
ethical, and in only some ways, but to deprive her of choice made in
other ways or based on other grounds, whether those concern lifestyle, risk assessment, or even indifference. Such qualifications placed
on the woman's power to choose deprive her of freedom because they
take from her hands the very essence of moral agency. When we tell
a child who wants to waste all of his hard-earned dollar on candy
that he can spend only twenty-five cents and then only for one of two
types of candy, we do not describe his decision about spending the
dollar as either full or free. Why? Because we have not allowed the
child to make what we view to be a bad decision; at least we have
limited the consequences of his decision by limiting his range of
choice. Unless we bear the responsibility for choice, we do not have
the freedom to choose. Thus the very enterprise of conditioning the
woman's authority to decide upon abortion, and of defining her freedom in terms of the conditions placed on it, is itself a denial of her
freedom to choose.
I do not mean to assert that no limitations can be imposed upon
the woman's abortion decision. What I mean to say is that the nature of the woman's decision and its relationship to her freedom
must be comprehended fully and first. Only thereafter, and in view
of a clear understanding of the woman's authority, should competing
interests be assessed. The plurality in Casey reversed this order, confusing the limitations that might be placed on a woman's freedom
with the definition of that freedom itself. In other words, the problem with each of the rationales commonly given for Roe is that the
competing interests and their assessment are embedded in the very
rationales for the woman's choice, and therefore serve directly to define her privacy, or freedom, itself, not simply to limit its exercise. In
depriving the woman of full choice and, therefore, freedom, the balancing against competing interests is preordained, as the woman's
claim, compromised from the beginning, lacks any force when balanced against other interests.
The woman's claim, instead, must be uniquely her own, as a
woman, and its source must be found in her freedom, which connotes
unconditional 3 authority to decide and unconditional responsibility
31. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the definition of freedom requires unconditional
choice does not negate the possibility of certain, though limited, limitations being placed on it,
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for decision. Unconditional authority does not mean unlimited authority, but it does necessarily imply a range of choices broad
enough to include the possibility of error, however that be judged,
and the related possibility that moral, legal, or social consequences
may have to be borne in the event of error. But error can only occur,
and responsibility for it can only be attached, if the woman is free to
act as her own, independent, moral agent and if she is not protected
from the consequences of what we might view as her error.
In many respects this unconditional idea of freedom is reflected
in the Supreme Court's approach to the religion guarantees. Both in
the establishment and free exercise guarantees, non-religious as well
as religious choices are protected. Some would find this strange, on
the ground that the guarantee of freedom of religion ought not to
acknowledge constitutional significance in erroneous choice, such as
a choice against religion. But most would understand, on reflection,
that the individual's freedom in religious matters must comprehend a
decision against religion. Otherwise there would be no freedom and a
decision for religion would be no more than a hollow one. The point
I am making is not that atheism is error, but rather that even for
those who think it is, it would be a denial of freedom to restrict the
individual only to choosing the "right" answer, especially if that
were done by intimate oversight of and active participation in the
decision. Without freedom to err, there is no freedom. This is the
point when he observed that "[w]e are
essence of Isaiah Berlin's
32
choose."1
to
doomed
The abortion decision is one that cannot fairly be said to exist
independent of the woman's free moral agency. Without full choice
and responsibility the woman cannot be said to have any choice. In
matters of faith we do not regulate the way choices are made; the
causes of those choices, be they volitional or not; the allegiances entered into; or the qualms, qualifications, and changes of view subsequently to be entertained. So also with the decision to bear a child.
.If
we ask why and then permit only certain reasons to be considered,
if we condition choice based on the volitional or non-volitional character of the act giving rise to the decision, if we foreclose anyone
from bearing the responsibility for certain kinds of choice by limiting
the way the choice is made, if we devalue the decision because it will
but if the freedom issue is first addressed the authority to impose limitations will be differently
(and more narrowly) defined. This, of course, is the explanation for Justice Blackmun's requirement of strict scrutiny in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
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always be revisited, and may well be recanted, then we wrest also
the power of choice from the person so restricted. Indeed, we deny
the choice being protected the very quality that warrants protection
- the quality of freedom.
B.

Persuasion,Punishment, and Freedom

One might ask why the decision to continue a pregnancy, or not
to do so, is a choice requiring such free and complete moral agency
and whether any other instances of such complete authority are recognized in the law. The quick answers are that moral agency is warranted by the private nature of the decision, that moral agency is
present and inescapable by virtue of the physical connection between
a woman and her fetus, and that we recognize similar moral agency
often in the law - indeed with only infrequent exceptions.
But explaining the answer requires fuller discussion which must
begin with a physical fact. Pregnancy and childbirth are unique:
unique to women and unique, in each case, to each individual woman. Only a woman faces a decision about potential life that is
physically attached to and utterly dependent upon her and that cannot be removed from her physically so as to lift the burden of choice
and transfer it to another. The pregnant woman bears the consequences no matter who decides or how the decision is made, for the
fetus is part of her. She is thus physically attached in a way that
denies the possibility of her being morally detached. There may be
no other situation like it.
Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the situation, one might still
ask why such complete freedom should be granted to the woman giving her the full power to decide - in the abortion setting when
such complete freedom is not granted in other legal settings. The
answer is that the woman's freedom to decide about abortion is not
unique. We grant similarly broad freedom in a wide range of situations. The opposite view is based on a misunderstood distinction. In
some cases the law recognizes an individual's freedom to choose,
such as the freedom to choose religion, and immunizes the individual
from any consequences of that choice. In other cases the law recognizes an equal freedom of the individual to choose, but imposes sanctions on the consequences of that choice. The fact that the individual
must bear the costs or consequences of a choice, even criminal punishment, 3 does not mean that the individual lacks freedom to
33. I am not saying that the imposition of criminal punishment would be consistent with
the woman's freedom. As Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), rightly holds, it would not. I am
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choose. Indeed, an individual's responsibility is an important part of
freedom.
It is in this sense that the law does grant complete freedom, or
full moral agency, in other settings, just as in the abortion setting;
but in the abortion setting, unlike others, we have historically and
consistently chosen as a society not to visit consequences on the woman for her choice. The crucial distinction, therefore, is not between
instances in which an individual's choice is immunized from subsequent penalty and those in which it is not; rather, the crucial distinction is between situations in which limits are placed on one's choice
before the fact, which are rare, and situations in which consequences
are visited on it after the fact.
Let me explain the point further through use of an illustration.
Murder is unlawful, yet murder is an act based on a decision that is
legally recognized as the product of the individual's free moral
agency. Indeed, the individual's freedom is a critical, and necessary,
precondition to the legal conclusion of guilt, for mens rea, the capacity to know "right" from "wrong," must be proved. Some "murder"
is legitimated in law - forgiven or excused, and even, as in war,
authorized and blessed. It might be argued that the law does condition acts of free moral agency, so why not with the woman's decision
to abort? The problem with this line of reasoning is twofold. First, in
permitting defenses to murder, the law is acting permissibly, not denying the individual's responsibility to choose from among a full
range of options, nor limiting that range, but blessing some in advance as a matter of policy. In doing so the law is not drawing exclusively moral lines. It is drawing social ones. Second, in punishing
murder the law it is not denying the murderer full moral agency or
full moral responsibility for his or her decision and act. The law is
visiting social consequences - perhaps in addition to moral consequences - on the act, and it is doing so once the act, and the moral
agency that accompanied it, has transpired.
So also, we might say, with abortion. The law might permit
some abortions and not others, though for social reasons and not as
an act of collective moral agency. In doing so it would visit consequences - social ones and quite explicitly not moral ones - on the
act and the actor. Or the law might visit no legal consequences, either because the act is deemed constructive or because the law
suggesting, however, that the imposition of criminal punishment after the fact would reflect a
greater measure of freedom than the regime of advance regulation sustained in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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chooses to rely on other instruments, social or moral, for exacting
consequences on the individual. But in either event, the law would
still recognize the moral agency and responsibility of the woman. It
would not attempt to regulate the decision in advance; it would not
attempt to force state participation in the decision actively and persuasively, whether it be about murder or abortion. To regulate the
decision, to intervene persuasively and coercively in the decision itself, to limit it not in the service of independent competing interests,
but instead because of the nature of the individual's decision or its
basis in one view of "right" moral reflection, would be to assume
moral agency for the choice, something we clearly do not do with
murder.
This illustration may disclose the difficulty society has in addressing the abortion decision; it is a difficulty of two dimensions.
With abortion, and particularly with the Casey decision, we have
attempted to introduce the state into the decision-making process: to
regulate the woman's decision before and as it is made; to limit the
circumstances in which it can be made; to actively participate in it,
to influence it, and to shape it. " But we have chosen not to visit
consequences on the woman once the decision has been made. 35 This
is a very different and more invasive form of social control than is
typical in, for example, the criminal laws, which operate after the
fact.36 It is certainly not a typical form of government regulation
employed in the setting of inescapably individual, and indeed intimate, choices.
In regulating the abortion decision-making process rather than
34. In these respects the state's involvement is very different from other regulatory efforts to provide information to people who make choices.
35. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act challenged in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), contains no provisions that impose criminal or civil liability on the
woman who has an abortion in violation of the Act. The various civil and professional penalties
dispersed throughout the Act visit liability principally on the physician, health care provider,
or facility, and not on the woman. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 3204(d); 3205(c),(d);
3206(i); 3207(b); 3209(e); 3210(b); 3211(b),(d); 3213(c),(f); 3214(i); 3215(h); 3217; 3219(b)
(1990). With respect to express or implied crimes derived from the Act or based on other
sources, section 3218 absolves the woman of liability. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(a)
(1990).
36. It is true that we often attempt as a society to regulate behavior that is deemed
likely to lead to crime. Restricting the availability of handguns, which can be used to injure or
kill, is an example; education is another. But both of these forms of regulation are abstracted
from a particular, known choice or act; neither involves intrusion into a particular decision
with the intention of changing or shaping it coercively or persuasively. The closest we, as a
society, come to such specific intrusion into decisions before they are made is preventive detention, which is permitted rarely and only, in effect, after the fact and based on a prior act and
decision, or commitment of the mentally ill, who are presumed in law to be incapable of exercising reasoned free will.
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imposing consequences on the decision once made, society has attempted to draw lines on explicitly moral (and inescapably sectarian) grounds, not on secular grounds of social utility or policy. We
have attempted to substitute a collective moral agency in each individual case for the moral agency of the woman who bears the fetus
in her. By regulating the decision-making process, not the decision,
society has attempted to make the woman do what is morally right
(of her own free will!). It is as if we decided not to impose liability
on newspapers for libel, but instead to superintend editorial decisions
by appointing an agent of government to the newspaper's editorial
board with veto power over editorial decisions that are not fully and
thoughtfully based on the "proper" considerations - and then to
claim that the publication decisions were the newspaper's alone and
that editorial freedom was secure.
While the woman is the nominal agent of choice under such a
regulatory regime she has in truth been denied the power of choice.
Society, through law, has undertaken to exercise her moral agency
for her. This is, of course, by definition impossible. And even if it
were possible, we have no way, collectively and in a secular society,
of knowing what is morally right for her. We certainly have little if
any experience, except in the cases of children and the mentally disabled, with the legal system's attempt to define and impose collective
moral agency on particular choices.
Resort to such intrusive government involvement is generally
not necessary. In the absence of such intervention there remains ample room for social control, but by different and more familiar
means. The control can be exercised, as is commonly done, through
after-the-fact criminal sanctions visited on the perpetrator or responsible party. By the same process of reasoning in the abortion setting
one could argue, before Roe, that criminal or civil penalties could
have been visited on the woman.3 7 To do so would be to respect or at
least to acknowledge her moral agency as well as her social responsibility for the consequences of her act. It would be to treat her as a
whole person capable of choice - "doomed to choose ' 3 8- but responsible to society for that choice. 9
37. 1 would argue that we couldn't do this because of the woman's liberty or freedom, at
least (as Roe indicates) in the absence of competing interests of a compelling nature achieved
through a narrowly-tailored restriciton on the woman's full and fully acknowledged liberty.
See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. But my point here is a different and more
limited one not dependent on the substantive argument, but going instead to the rationale
underlying the Casey plurality opinion.
38. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
39. One might argue that since Roe foreclosed imposing criminal punishment on the
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We could have done this, but we didn't, and few among the
persons who would overrule Roe v. Wade would suggest that we do
so today.4" There, in the end, is the rub. Why didn't we? Why have
we instead attempted to regulate the woman's choice before and as
it is made - to take full choice from the woman, notwithstanding
her physical inextricability from the decision - but to visit legal
consequences for her choice only on others, such as doctors, who execute her decision? This is like attempting to regulate the decisionmaking process of a murderer but, when that fails and the murder
takes place, to jail only the person who sold the gun used to commit
the murder, not the person who actually fired it. We would think
such a result strange in virtually every other context but abortion.
Why don't we consider it strange in the abortion setting?
The reason, I think, is that we don't consider the woman who
has an abortion to be "legally" culpable."' At least we have not considered her so as measured by the standard normally applied to such
questions in a democratic society, the legislative process. We may
think her "morally" culpable; that is an individual matter. But as a
society we don't feel comfortable visiting legal consequences on her
for what many, even perhaps a democratic majority, would consider
to be her faulty moral choice. The moral consequences to her will be
enough. Interestingly, this view respects the woman's complete and
free moral agency. It simply, and by a conscious exercise of societal
self-restraint, withholds any societal sanction as either unnecessary
or, given the nature of the act, inappropriate.
But given this, it is peculiar, perhaps unprecedented, and some
might argue unconstitutional to use society's unwillingness to impose
after-the-fact sanctions on the woman as a justification for wresting
the full authority to choose from the woman before-the-fact by regulatory intrusions based on moral preferences.42 This is, indeed, particularly strange if we have come to see the act as a purely moral
woman, the state is forced to regulate the decision in advance. But the fact that Roe made
criminal punishment unconstitutional by virtue of the woman's liberty hardly seems a convincing reason to deny the same liberty by other means.
40. The history of abortion restrictions and their focus on persons who perform abortion
and not on the woman, is amply surveyed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52, 151 nn. 4950 (1973).
41. An alternative explanation would be that we don't consider the woman to be morally
capable. This is a proposition which, at least when put in such explicit terms, would be widely
rejected; it would also be clearly unconstitutional. Yet there is much in the history of abortion
that suggests it. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52 (1973).
42. More commonly we justify legal participation in an individual's decisions on the rare
circumstances in which after-the-fact sanctions are foreclosed or futile, such as with children
or the mentally disabled.
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wrong, if any wrong at all. For such wrongs legal sanctions visited
before the fact and not after it would be incongruous, inappropriate,
and perhaps unconstitutional. The reason for this is that the law does
not, and cannot, sanction purely and exclusively moral wrongs. It
must instead sanction their social consequences.
For the law to do otherwise would ask the impossible, because it
would assume a rule that is socially unasceftainable. It would make
law, and through it society, the collective instrument of individual
moral agency. This cannot happen in a pluralistic and secular state
that acknowledges wide freedom in matters of moral or religious
conviction. It is, in the end, in this sense and in this sense alone that
in "dooming" the woman to choose, Roe v. Wade made her free.
V.

Conclusion

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Supreme Court, acting
through a plurality of three, made two fundamental errors. First, it
misunderstood the abortion issue and the woman's claim of authority
as resting ultimately on a thin veneer of analogical reasoning, on an
authority that found its strength in its similarity with other claims,
grounded on its sameness, not on its uniqueness. The result was that
the woman's claim was not granted its own stature, and the assertion
of right was not seen as an assertion of freedom. Freedom, in short,
was sacrificed in the interest of a peculiar idea of equality. And this
idea of equality, analogically imprisoned, permitted the Court, quite
paradoxically in retrospect, to sustain a form of regulation that was
unequaled.
The Court's second error was to understand freedom as meaning only immunity from legal consequences, not as the capacity to
choose, and even to err. By this misunderstanding the Court was
able to declare allegiance to freedom by reaffirming Roe and the
woman's "ultimate" authority to decide while at the same time eviscerating it through a regime that expressly conditioned the woman's
right to decide, and that visited persuasive regulation in advance of
the decision. Indeed, this was done by a regime that can only be
characterized as governmental participationin the decision. But we
are not free to choose if government is a partner in our choice, a
pervasive presence armed with the coercive authority of law. We are
not free unless we are "doomed to choose" - unless we are permitted the freedom to err.
Freedom is what Justice Blackmun had in mind in Roe v.
Wade. Freedom is what he articulated there and has since captured
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in the term "emancipation." The "freedom" offered by the plurality
in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, a "freedom" to choose in the company of others, in only certain ways, only "wisely," 4 3 and only after
the legally forced presence and persuasive participation of the state,
is neither genuine freedom nor full emancipation. It is, instead, a
concept lacking substantive content, imprisoned by equality, and
predicated on a vision of the relationship of the state to the individual as one of parent to a morally adolescent child.

43.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (plurality opinion).

